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Abstract
We consider a dynamic version of sender-receiver games, where the sequence of
states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild as-
sumptions, we provide a simple characterization of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs,
as players become very patient. Under these assumptions, the limit set depends on the
Markov chain only through its invariant measure. The (limit) equilibrium payoffs are
the feasible payoffs that satisfy an individual rationality condition for the receiver, and
an incentive compatibility condition for the sender.
1 Introduction
Since Crawford and Sobel (1982), sender-receiver games, or cheap-talk games, have become
a natural framework for studying issues of information transmission between a privately
informed ‘expert’ and an uninformed decision maker, where the two parties have non-aligned
interests.
When the decision maker acts only once, the extent to which information can be shared
at equilibrium has been studied extensively, when ‘talk’ takes place prior to the decision
stage. While Crawford and Sobel (1982), see also Green and Stokey (2007), have focused
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on the case where communication is limited to a single costless and non-verifiable message
from the sender to the receiver, more recent papers have shown that this restriction is not
innocuous, and have characterized the equilibrium outcomes for general cheap-talk games,
see Krishna and Morgan (2001), Aumann and Hart (2003).1 This work has been motivated
by numerous concrete situations. We refer to Krishna and Morgan (2008), Farrell and Rabin
(1996), and Sobel (2009) for a discussion of these applications.
The present work is motivated by the following observation. Whether the sender is a
financial advisor who provides advice to a client, an expert who is consulted on a project, or
a referee on a project/person, the situation often calls for a dynamic approach. Indeed, the
financial advisor provides advice on a series of investments, and the expert and the referee
may be consulted on successive, related projects.
Golosov, Skreta, Tsyvinsky and Wilson (2009) consider such a situation. They assume
that the sender repeatedly sends messages, the receiver repeatedly makes decisions, while
the state of the world remains fixed throughout. Within the Crawford and Sobel framework
(continuum of states/messages), they show that, for some specifications on the initial dis-
tribution on states, (necessarily complex) equilibria exist, that achieve full revelation of the
state of the world in finite time.
We here deal with situations in which the state of the world may change through time.
Specifically, we assume that the successive states form an irreducible Markov chain over some
finite set. In every stage, the sender issues a message/recommendation, and the receiver
makes a decision. States are only known to the sender, and payoffs only depend on the
current state and on the receiver’s decision, but not on the message sent by the sender.
Since states are autocorrelated, any information disclosed in stage n provides valuable
information in later stages as well, as in Golosov et al. (2009). Yet, since the Markov Chain
is irreducible, this information becomes eventually valueless.
Intuitively, the inter-temporal situation puts some restrictions on the players’ behavior.
As an illustration, the opinion of an expert who systematically provides laudative reports
will eventually come to be discounted, if not ignored, since the decision maker is aware of
the fact that the time-average report of the quality of people/projects should reflect the
invariant measure of the states of the world. On the other hand, an expert who genuinely
provides accurate information to promote efficiency, but sees that the decision maker only
acts in his interests, may become wary and may stop to provide valuable information to
the decision maker. As is well-known from repeated games, the sender may indeed provide
1The case of verifiable messages has also been studied in detail, see Forges and Koessler (2008).
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powerful incentives by conditioning his future communication policy on the behavior of the
decision maker. Similar insights already appear in the literature on dynamic contracting,
see Baron and Besanko (1984), Besanko (1985) or Battaglini (2005).
Our paper relates to the recent and growing literature on incomplete information games,
in which the uncertainty evolves, see, e.g., Athey and Bagwell (2008), Mailath and Samuelson
(2001), Phelan (2006), Renault (2006), Wiseman (2008), and Ho¨rner, Rosenberg, Solan and
Vieille (2010) and, especially, Escobar and Toikka (2010).
We provide a characterization of the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when
players are very patient.
Our main findings are the following. We first show (Theorem 1) that a feasible payoff
vector is a (limit) equilibrium payoff as soon as the following two conditions are met. On
the one hand, the payoff of the receiver should be at least his babbling equilibrium payoff.
This condition is an individual rationality condition. Indeed, the latter payoff is equal to
the receiver minmax payoff in the dynamic game since the receiver has the option to ignore
the announcements of the sender. On the other hand, the sender’s payoff should satisfy
an incentive compatibility condition, which reflects the fact that the sender has the option
of substituting artificially generated states to the true ones when playing, as long as the
artificial states are statistically undistinguishable from the true ones. As it turns out, this
incentive constraint takes the form of finitely many linear inequalities.
In the corresponding equilibria, with high probability the sender truthfully reports the
current state most of the time , while the receiver responds in a stationary manner to the
announcements of the sender, and checks that the distribution of these announcements is
consistent with the invariant measure.2
We next show (Theorem 2) that the converse inclusion holds under some additional con-
dition on the Markov chain, which we callAssumption A: any limit equilibrium payoff must
satisfy the individual rational condition and the specific version of the incentive compatibility
requirement of Theorem 1.
A noteworthy consequence is that, under Assumption A, the limit set of equilibrium
payoffs does not depend on how successive states are correlated, nor on fine details of the
sequence of states, but only on the invariant measure. It is also irrelevant whether the sender
learns some, or even all, of the realization of the future states in advance. In particular, the
set of equilibrium payoffs can be computed as if successive states were independent.
Our results are valid for a large (open) class of payoff functions for the static game,
2While this is reminiscent of the revelation principle, we must stress that no revelation principe applies
in our setting.
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but not for all of them. More precisely, we prove that for generic payoff functions (and
under Assumption A), either our results hold, or all equilibria of the repeated game are
payoff-equivalent to babbling equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we
explain most insights by means of an example. The main results appear in Section 4, together
with an illustration. Proofs are discussed in Section 5 and the Appendix. Additional results
and comments are provided in Section ??. The Appendix contains all proof details.
2 Model
We study dynamic sender-receiver games, in which the state of the world changes through
time. At each stage n ≥ 1, the sender (player 1) observes the current state of the world
sn ∈ S, and makes an announcement an ∈ A. Upon observing an, the receiver (player
2) chooses an action bn ∈ B. The current action bn, together with the current state sn,
determines the utility vector u(sn, bn) ∈ R
2 at stage n. Only the action bn is then publicly
disclosed. We thus maintain the assumption that payoffs are not observed.The two players
share a common discount factor δ.
We assume throughout that the set of states S, the set of messages A, and the set of
actions B, are finite. We also assume that there are at least as many messages as states. This
assumption ensures that the only motives for concealing the state are strategic. We thus leave
aside situations in which, due to capacity constraints, the sender might be forced to choose
which feature of the state to reveal. For simplicity, we will actually assume throughout that
the set A of messages coincides with the set S of states. (As will be seen, this assumption is
without loss of generality in our setup.)
We assume that the states (sn) follow a Markov chain over S, with transition function
p(· | ·), which is irreducible and aperiodic.3 The Markov chain therefore admits a unique
invariant measure, m ∈ ∆(S). For convenience, we assume that the first state, s1, is drawn
according to m. This ensures that the law of sn is equal to m, for every n ≥ 1.
In this setup, a strategy of the sender maps past and current realized states, and past
play, into a mixed message, and is thus a map σ : ∪n≥0(S × A× B)n × S → ∆(A), while a
strategy of the receiver is a map τ : ∪n≥0(A × B)n → ∆(B). A stationary strategy of the
3That is, for any two states s, t ∈ S, and for every N ∈ N large enough, the probability of moving from
s to t in exactly N stages is positive.
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receiver is a map y : A→ ∆(B), with the interpretation that the receiver chooses his action
according to y(· | a) ∈ ∆(B) whenever told a ∈ A.
Our goal is to study to what extent the dynamic structure of the game affects the equi-
librium outcomes. Formally, we aim at providing a characterization of the limit set of
sequential equilibrium payoffs, and at understanding equilibrium behavior, when players are
very patient.
3 An Example
We here illustrate our main results by means of a simple example. There are two states,
S = {L,R}, and two actions for the receiver, l and r. Successive states are independent and
equally likely. Payoffs are given by the two tables in Figure 1, where c is a fixed parameter,
with c ∈ (1, 2). The sender and the receiver are respectively players 1 and 2.
l r
c, 2 2, 1
State L
l r
1,−1 2, 1
State R
Figure 1: The payoffs of the two players.
The one-shot information transmission game has a unique equilibrium, in which the
receiver plays r with probability 1. To see this, note that the sender strictly prefers action r
over action l, no matter what the state is. Thus, at equilibrium, all messages that are sent
with positive probability induce the same mixed action by the Receiver. This constant mixed
action, being always ex post optimal for the Receiver, is therefore also ex ante optimal. It
must thus assign probability one to action r.
All equilibria in the one-shot game are therefore babbling equilibria.4 Plainly, the dy-
namic game admits a babbling equilibrium, in which the sender repeatedly makes the same
announcement, the receiver treats the announcements as being non-informative, and plays
r in every stage. On the other hand, the receiver can always choose to ignore the announce-
ments of the sender, and to play r in every stage, thereby getting 1. As a result, the babbling
equilibrium is the worst equilibrium for the receiver, in both the one-shot and in the dynamic
game.
We claim that the dynamic game has equilibrium payoffs that are arbitrarily close to
4In the sense that the action of the receiver is independent of the message sent by the sender.
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(2+c
2
, 3
2
). In particular, and in contrast with the receiver, there are equilibrium payoffs for
the sender that are below the babbling equilibrium payoff. Here is the intuition. The sender
announces the true state at every stage. The receiver listens to the announcements of the
sender, and plays l when told L, and r when told R. To prevent the sender from announcing
R in every stage, the receiver monitors the announcements of the sender, and stops listening
if there is an obvious bias (towards either L or R). Under the constraint that he should
announce both states equally often, the expected payoff of the sender is highest when he
reports truthfully.
While this intuition is simple, formalizing it into an equilibrium of the discounted game
is not straightforward. Indeed, because payoffs are discounted, the sender may have a pref-
erence to send at first the message R more frequently.
We start with a simple construction that yields an equilibrium payoff distinct from (2, 1).
Assume that the discount factor satisfies δ >
4− 2c
3− c
, and consider the following strategy
profile.
• At odd stages, the sender announces truthfully the current stage, and the receiver plays
l if told L, and r if told R.
• At even stages, the sender announces a constant message, and the receiver plays the
action that he did not play in the previous stage.
• If the receiver deviates, both players switch to the babbling equilibrium forever.
Under this strategy profile, expected payoffs are equal to
1
1 + δ
(
2 + c
2
+ δ
5 + c
4
)
and
1
1 + δ
(
3
2
+
3
4
δ
)
respectively. Because a deviation of the receiver is followed by the babbling equilibrium,
which yields 1 to the receiver, and because the (conditional) expected payoff of the receiver
is at least 1 in every stage, no deviation of the receiver is profitable. Regarding the sender,
it is sufficient to show that he cannot profit by deviating in any block of two stages. In such
a block the sender has two possible deviations: to announce L in the first stage of the block
when the true state is R, and to announce R in the first stage of the block when the true
state is L. In the former case, he gets 1 at the first stage and 2 in the second (instead of 2
at the first stage and 1+c
2
at the second stage if he announces truthfully). In the latter case,
he gets 2 at the first stage and 1+c
2
at the second stage (instead of c at the first stage and 2
at the second stage if he announces truthfully). The choice of δ ensures that none of these
deviations is profitable.
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To get payoffs closer to (2+c
2
, 3
2
), we will be relying on a slightly more complex construc-
tion. We let the size 2N of a block be large enough, so that a law of large numbers will
apply. Once N is fixed, we let the discount factor δ be high enough, so that the contribution
of any individual block to the overall discounted payoff is very small.
We first describe a pure strategy τ of the receiver. In each block (unless if the receiver
has deviated earlier), the receiver listens to the sender’s announcements, plays l if told L,
r if told R, until the number of announcements of either L or R exceeds N . When this is
the case, the receiver stops listening to the sender’s announcements, and repeats the least
frequent action until the end of the current block.5 In a sense, the sender is restricted to
announcing both states equally often in any given block of 2N stages. As such, the intuition
here is similar to some extent to the one behind the linking mechanism of Jackson and
Sonnenschein (2007) and, even more, to the analysis in Escobar and Toikka (2010).6
If indeed the sender reports truthfully the current state, there is a high probability that
the receiver will be listening to the sender most of the time, and the expected payoff is
therefore close to (2+c
2
, 3
2
).
In contrast with the situation examined above, it need not be optimal for the sender to
report truthfully when facing τ . However, a crucial insight is that any best reply of the
sender to τ must be reporting truthfully most of the time, with high probability. To see
why, observe that any best reply achieves a payoff of at least, say, 2+c
2
− ε. But since the
receiver plays both actions l and r equally likely on each block, this implies that with high
probability the action of the receiver matches the state, most of the time.
We let σ be any pure best-reply of the sender to τ . On the equilibrium path, we let
players play according to σ and τ . By construction, the equilibrium property holds for the
sender. To deter the receiver from deviating, both players switch forever to the babbling
equilibrium once a deviation of the receiver is detected. Since blocks are short, the expected
continuation payoff of the receiver is close to 3
2
following any history, while the receiver gets
a payoff of 1 (or close to 1) if he deviates.
5An alternative construction, that we adopt in the general case, is for the receiver to generate a specific
sequence of fictitious announcements, and continue as if the sender’s announcements were equal to the
fictitious ones.
6The present analysis and the one in Escobar and Toikka (2010) were developed independently.
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4 Main Results
We here state and discuss two results on the limit set of equilibrium payoffs. Loosely speak-
ing, according to Theorem 1, all payoff vectors that are individually rational for the receiver
and incentive compatible for the receiver are (asymptotically) equilibrium payoffs. Theorem
2 proves the converse inclusion. Further results are provided in Section ??.
4.1 Theorem 1
We start with some notations. We denote by M⊂ ∆(S×A) the set of copulas based on m;
that is, the set of distributions µ over S ×A whose marginals on S and on A are both equal
to m.7 The set M is defined by a finite number of linear inequalities, hence it is a compact
convex polyhedron, so it has finitely many extreme points.
We denote by µ0 ∈M the specific distribution defined as µ0(s, s) = m(s) for each s ∈ S,
and µ0(s, a) = 0 if s 6= a. Under µ0, the messages and the states coincide a.s. Thus, the
distribution µ0 is the long-run average distribution of the sequence (sn, an)n when the sender
reports truthfully the current state.
Given a copula µ ∈M, and a stationary strategy y : A→ ∆(B), we set
U(µ, y) :=
∑
s∈S,a∈A
µ(s, a)u(s, y(· | a)) ∈ R2.
This is the expected payoff vector when the sender’s report is drawn according to µ(· | s),
and the receiver plays y.
We denote by
v2 := max
b∈B
∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, b) (1)
the babbling equilibrium payoff for the receiver.
Definition 1 We let E(M) denote the set of payoff vectors U(µ0, y), where y : A→ ∆(B),
that satisfy
C1. U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for every µ ∈M.
C2. U2(µ0, y) ≥ v2,
We define Ê(M) as the set of payoff vectors U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M) where the inequalities in
C1 and C2 are strict. That is, Ê(M) is the set of vectors U(µ0, y), y : A → ∆(B)), such
that
7Recall that the set A of messages is a copy of S.
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D1. U1(µ0, y) > U
1(µ, y) for every µ ∈M, µ 6= µ0.
D2. U2(µ0, y) > v
2.
Note that condition D1 holds as soon as the inequality U1(µ0, y) > U
1(µ, y) is satisfied
for each of the finitely many extreme points µ 6= µ0 of M.
We denote by SEδ the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs of the game with discount
factor δ. Our first main result, Theorem 1, shows that all payoffs in E(M) can be obtained
as equilibrium payoffs, provided that players are sufficiently patient.
Theorem 1 Suppose that there exists a public randomizing device, which outputs a (uni-
formly distributed) number in [0, 1] in every stage, after the announcement of the sender. If
Ê(M) 6= ∅ then
E(M) ⊆ lim inf
δ→1
SEδ.
Theorem 1 means that for every γ ∈ E(M) and for every ε > 0, there exists δ0 < 1 such
that, for every δ ≥ δ0, the δ-discounted game has a sequential equibrium payoff within ε of
γ. 8 The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Section 5.1.
Few comments are in order.
The babbling payoff v2 is equal to the minmax value of the receiver in the dynamic
game. Hence condition C2 in Definition 1 reads as an individual rationality condition.
Condition C1 is akin to an incentive compatibility condition: under the constraint that the
distribution of messages is equal to the distribution of states, truth-telling is optimal for the
sender. According to Theorem 1, any payoff vector U(µ0, y) that is incentive compatible for
the sender, and individually rational for the receiver, is an equilibrium payoff for δ large.
Our construction will have the somewhat surprising feature that the sender reports truth-
fully, at least most of the time and with high probability. A direct intuition can be provided,
that is reminiscent of the revelation principle in mechanism design. Let an equilibrium (σ, τ)
be given. Consider the strategy profile where the sender reports truthfully, and the receiver
first computes the message that the strategy σ would have sent, and next plays what τ would
have played given this message. We argue loosely that this new profile (when supplemented
with threats) is an equilibrium. The key to the argument is twofold. On the one hand,
8We will actually prove the stronger statement that δ0 can be chosen to be independent of γ:
lim
δ→1
sup
γ∈E(M)
d(γ, SEδ) = 0.
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the sender can check that the receiver does indeed play as prescribed, and does not use the
additional information provided by the knowledge of the true state. On the other hand,
the threat of switching to the babbling equilibrium is effective because the knowledge of the
state at a given stage becomes eventually valueless in predicting distant stages, because of
the irreducibility property of the sequence of states. However, we should stress that no rev-
elation principle applies in our setup, and our equilibrium construction relies on the threat
that the sender will stop providing information following a deviation.
Theorem 1 relies on two assumptions. The public randomizing device can easily be dis-
pensed with, provided one slightly extends the communication options offered to the players.
To be specific, assume that the players are allowed to exchange simultaneous ’messages’, after
the sender has reported a state. Under such an assumption, players can implement jointly
controlled lotteries as in Aumann and Maschler (1995), which can substitute for the random-
ization device. Details are standard and omitted. However, when instead communication is
restricted to a single message sent by the sender, then the existence of a public randomizing
device is not without loss of generality, see Section 6.2 for an example.
Theorem 1 also requires Ê(M) to be non-empty. This is similar to the non-empty interior
type of conditions which appear in Folk Theorems. Yet, we must stress that our assumption
is somewhat stronger, since Ê(M) need not be equal to the relative interior of E(M), and
the condition that Ê(M) 6= ∅ is not generically satisfied. We provide a robust example
where Ê(M) = ∅ and elaborate further on this issue in Section 6.1.
It is not an easy task to rely on Definition 1 to check whether a given payoff vector U(µ, y)
belongs to E(M). Fortunately, it turns out that conditions C1 and D1 are equivalent to
much simpler conditions.
Lemma 1 Let y : A → ∆(B) be given. Conditions C1 and D1 are respectively equivalent
to conditions C’1 and D’1 below.
C’1
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s)) ≥
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s))), for every permutation φ over S.
D’1
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s)) >
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s))), for every permutation φ over S that is not the
identity mapping.
The proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. Interestingly, conditions C’1 and D’1 do
not involve the invariant distribution m. The intuition is best explained in the case of two
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states, s0 and s1. Assume that the sender is considering mis-reporting the state, under the
constraint that the distribution of reports matches the invariant distribution m of the state.
The only way to do this is to report s1 instead of s0, as often as to report s0 instead of s1.
Whether such a deviation is profitable is equivalent to asking how the unweighted sum of
the payoffs obtained in s0 when reporting s1 and in s1 when reporting s0 compares to the
unweighted sum of the payoffs obtained in the two states when reporting truthfully.
4.2 Theorem 2
Our second main result provides the converse inclusion to that in Theorem 1. It requires
one substantive assumption on the behavior of the state, Assumption A below.
Assumption 1 (Assumption A) There exist nonnegative numbers αs, s ∈ S, with
∑
s∈S\{s¯}
αs ≤
1 (for every s¯ ∈ S), such that p(s′ | s) = αs′ whenever s′ 6= s.
Assumption A is restrictive. Yet it does e.g. hold in the following cases.
Assume first that changes in the state are due to shocks, which occur at random times.
Once drawn, the state remains constant until a shock occurs. The state is then drawn
anew, according to m. The inter-arrival times of the successive shocks are i.i.d., and follow
a geometric distribution. In that case, Assumption A is met. Indeed, it suffices to set
αt = pi × m(t) for every t ∈ S, where pi is the per-stage probability of a shock. The
parameter pi is here a measure of the state persistence. When pi increases from 0 to 1, the
situation evolves from one in which the state remains constant through time, to a situation
in which successive states are independent.
When pi = 1, the successive states are independent, and identically distributed according
to m. Thus, Assumption A holds in the case of i.i.d. states.
Assumption A also holds in the benchmark case where there are only two possible
states. Indeed, denoting the two states by s1 and s2, it suffices to set α1 = p(s1 | s2) and
α2 = p(s2 | s1). In particular, it is satisfied in the models in Athey and Bagwell (2008),
Phelan (2006) and Wiseman (2008).
As a further simple illustration, consider a symmetric random walk on three states. That
is, whenever in a state, the chain moves to each of the two other states with probability 1
2
.
Again, Assumption A is met, with αs =
1
2
for each s ∈ S.
We denote by NEδ the set of (Nash) equilibrium payoffs in the game with discount factor
δ.
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Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumption A holds. Then, for every δ < 1, one has
NEδ ⊆ E(M).
Provided that Ê(M) 6= ∅ and that Assumption A is met, Theorems 1 and 2 thus imply
that the set of sequential equilibrium payoffs SEδ converges to the set E(M) (as soon as a
randomizing device is available).
Note that the set M of copulas only depends on the invariant measure m, and not on
finer details of the transition function. A striking implication of the characterization is that,
under Assumption A, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs therefore only depends on the
invariant measure m. In particular, the limit set of equilibrium payoffs is the same as when
the states are drawn independently across stages. That is, the amount of state persistence
is irrelevant for the determination of the limit set of equilibrium payoffs.
If the initial state s were to remain fixed throughout the play, the game would fall into the
class of repeated games with incomplete information introduced by Aumann and Maschler
(1995). (This is the setup studied in Golosov et al. (2009).) In this case, the limit set of
discounted equilibrium payoffs, when δ goes to 1, is typically not equal to E(M). Hence,
there is a discontinuity in the limit set of equilibrium payoffs when successive states become
perfectly autocorrelated.9
By contrast, for a fixed discount factor, the set of equilibrium payoffs is upper hemi-
continuous with respect to the transition function. The source of this apparent paradox can
be traced back to the fact that, in loose terms, the convergence of the set SEδ to E(M) is
slowlier, the more correlated successive states are.
The main insight to be derived from Theorem 2 is the following. The incentive compat-
ibility condition C2 is a very strong one. Indeed, it only requires from deviations that the
distribution of announcements matches the invariant measure. In particular, according to
Theorem 2, all equilibria are payoff equivalent to equilibria in which the receiver only checks
that the announcements frequencies are consistent with m. Yet, much more sophisticated
checks would be available to the receiver. The receiver might e.g. check that the empirical
distribution of two-letter words (s, s′) matches the transition function p, as in Escobar and
Toikka (2010), or look at the distribution of three-letter words, etc. This might potentially
allow the receiver to impose weaker incentive constraints than the one in C1, and therefore,
allow for equilibrium payoffs outside of E(M). Theorem 2 thus identifies one class of Markov
chains for which this is not the case.
9Our Theorems 1 and 2 extend to cover the case of uniform equilibrium payoffs.
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We provide below an example where the conclusion of Theorem 2 fails to hold if As-
sumption A is not satisfied. Thus, in general, the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs
does not only depend on the invariant measure, but also on finer details of the transition
function.
Example 1 Consider a game with 5 states S := {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. The sequence of states follows
a random walk on S. When in s, the chain moves either to s+1 (mod 5) or to s−1 (mod 5)
with equal probabilities. The action set B of the receiver coincides with S, and the payoff
function is described in Figure 2, where c > 1.
b = 0 b = 1 b = 2 b = 3 b = 4
s = 0
s = 1
s = 2
s = 3
s = 4 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1
0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 0, 0 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0
c, 0 1, 1 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
1, 1 c, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 2: The game in Example 1.
Thus, both players receive a payoff 1 if the action matches the current state, and 0
otherwise, except when the receiver chooses action 1 in state 0, or action 0 in state 1.
The payoff vector (1, 1) is not in E(M) as soon as c > 1. Indeed, the stationary strategy
y : A → ∆(B) defined by y(s | s) = 1 is the only strategy such that U(µ0, y) = (1, 1). But
then, the sender profits by reporting t = 1 whenever s = 0, and t = 0 whenever s = 1.
On the other hand, (1, 1) is an equilibrium payoff, as soon as c < 3
2
, provided the players
are patient enough. Indeed, consider the strategy of the receiver in which he matches the
announcement of the sender, as long as |an+1−an| = 1 modulo 5, and switches forever to the
babbling equilibrium (e.g., playing always b = 4) if |an+1− an| 6= 1 modulo 5 for some stage
n. Provided c is not too large, the best response of the sender is to report the true state. If
instead, say, the sender chooses to report t = 1 when in fact s = 0 in a given stage, he gains
c− 1, but then in the next period, with probability 1
2
the new state will be s = 4, and then
he will either report t ∈ {0, 2} and receive 0, or report t ∈ {1, 3, 4} and be punished with
the babbling equilibrium payoff 1
5
forever. Provided the players are patient enough, such a
deviation is not profitable.
In this equilibrium, the receiver checks that the one-step transitions between successive
announcements are consistent with the transitions of the Markov chain. As it turns out,
under Assumption A, such a sophisticated statistical analysis of the announcements is not
13
more powerful than a statistical analysis which is based only on the empirical frequencies of
the different announcements. 
Theorems 1 and 2 hold as soon as the sender knows the current state. As will be clear
from the proof, they continue to hold if the sender knows more. In particular, they hold in
the extreme case where the sender learns the entire sequence of realized states in stage 1, or
in any intermediate setup.
Note that we interpret the case δ → 1 as players being very patient. It is not possible here
to interpret it as a situation in which players would interact more and frequently. Indeed,
a proper analysis of this latter case would take into account the impact on transitions:
when players interact more frequently, states become more persistent between successive
interactions.
4.3 An illustration
We here analyze a simple, specific example to show how to pin down the set of equilibrium
payoffs using our results. We let the set of states be S = {s0, s1, s2}. Between any two
stages, the state changes with probability one, and each of the two possible states is equally
likely. Thus, p(t | s) = 1
2
for every s 6= t ∈ S. Note that Assumption A on the transition
function does hold, and that the invariant measure assigns probability 1
3
to each state.
The receiver has three actions, denoted L,M and R, and the payoffs in the different
states are given by the matrix  1, 1 0, 0 0, 00, 0 1, 0 0, 1
0, 0 0, 1 1, 0

where each row corresponds to a state, and each column to an action. For instance, the first
row specifies the payoffs in state s0, as a function of the action of the receiver.
All extreme points of the feasible set are obtained by having the sender report truthfully
the state, and the receiver then play a pure, state-dependent, action. Thus, all extreme
points are obtained by picking one entry in each row, and averaging. For instance, picking
L (resp. M , R) in row s0 (resp. s1, s2) and averaging over states leads to a payoff of (1,
1
3
).
One checks that the feasible set is the convex hull of the five payoffs (0, 0), (0, 2
3
), (1
3
, 1),
(2
3
, 0) and (1, 1
3
), see Figure 3 below.
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γ1
γ2
(0,2
3
)
(1
3
,1)
(1,1
3
)
(2
3
,0)
The feasible set
The equilibrium set
Figure 3
Without any information on the state, all three actions of the receiver yield 1
3
, hence v2 = 1
3
.
Let γ = U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M) be a (limit) equilibrium payoff, and denote by µ the cop-
ula obtained when the sender exchanges the two states s1 and s2 when reporting. Thus,
µ(s1, s2) = µ(s2, s1) = µ(s0, s0) =
1
3
, and µ(s, t) = 0 otherwise. Since the payoffs of the
two players are exchanged in the two states s1 and s2, one has U
1(µ, y) = U2(µ0, y) and
U1(µ0, y) = U
2(µ, y). The incentive condition U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) thus yields γ1 ≥ γ2.
Note finally that the sum of the players’ payoffs cannot exceed 2 in state s0, and 1 in
states s1 and s2. Thus, γ
1 + γ2 ≤ 1
3
(2 + 1 + 1) = 4
3
.
Hence, any equilibrium payoff (γ1, γ2) lies in the shaded triangle defined by the inequal-
ities γ2 ≥ 1
3
, γ1 + γ2 ≤ 4
3
, γ1 ≥ γ2, see Figure 3 below.
On the other hand, each of the extreme points of this triangle is an equilibrium payoff.
Indeed, (1
3
, 1
3
) is the babbling equilibrium payoff, while (2
3
, 2
3
) = U(µ0, y1) and (1,
1
3
) =
U(µ0, y2), where y1 : A → ∆(B) plays L when told s0, and randomizes between M and R
otherwise, while y2 plays L, M and R in states s0, s1 and s2 respectively.
As a result, the set of equilibrium payoffs is equal to the shaded triangle in Figure 3.
5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We here provide most details of the proof of Theorem 1. Some technical details are in
the Appendix. Since Ê(M) 6= ∅, there is y0 : A → ∆(B) such that U2(µ0, y0) > v2 and
U1(µ0, y0) > U
1(µ, y0) for every µ ∈M, µ 6= µ0.
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Let ε > 0 and U(µ0, y¯) ∈ E(M) be arbitrary, and define y := εy0 + (1 − ε)y¯. It is
sufficient to prove that U(µ0, y) is arbitrarily close to some sequential equilibrium payoff of
the δ-discounted game, provided δ is high enough.
5.1.1 The strategies
Let some integer N ∈ N, and a discount factor δ be given. We here define a strategy profile
(σ∗, τ∗).
According to (σ∗, τ∗), the play is divided into consecutive blocks of N stages. At the
beginning of each block, players discard past information, and re-start playing a N -stage
profile (σ0, τ0), where τ0 is a pure strategy. In case the receiver deviates from the pure
strategy τ0, the players switch to babbling play forever.
We now construct σ0 and τ0, starting with τ0. Consider any block of N stages. According
to τ0, the receiver ”listens” to the reported state an in stage n and plays y(· | an), as long no
state has been reported too often. As soon as this fails to be the case, the receiver substitutes
to the actual report of the sender some fictitious report θn, and plays according to y(· | θn).
To be formal, we pick a distribution mN ∈ ∆(S) which best approximates the invariant
measure m, among all distributions m˜ ∈ ∆(S) such that Nm˜(s) is an integer for all s.
For s ∈ S and n ∈ N, we denote by Nn(s) = |{k ≤ n : ak = s}| the number of stages
where the sender reported state s, and we set
q := min{1 ≤ n ≤ B : Nn(an) > NmN (an)}
(min ∅ = +∞). Intuitively, each state s ∈ S is allotted a quota of announcements equal to
N mN (s). The stage q is the first stage in which quotas are no longer met. From stage q
until the end of the block, the receiver substitutes fictitious reports to actual ones.
Formally, we let (θn) (n = 1, . . . , N) be a sequence such that
F1. θn = an for n < q;
F2. For each s ∈ S, the equality |{n ≤ N : θn = s}| = NmN (s) always hold;
F3. Conditional on (a1, . . . , aq), the variables (θq, . . . , θN ) are deterministic.
We will refer to θn as the announcement at stage n. Condition F1 means that the an-
nouncements coincide with the sender’s actual announcements prior to stage q; condition
F2 ensures that the entire sequence of announcements always satisfies the quotas; condition
F3 ensures in particular that the fictitious announcements are commonly known between
the two players.
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Thanks to the public randomizing device, the strategy τ0 may be rewritten as a pure
strategy. 10
The strategy σ0 is defined to be any pure best-reply strategy of the sender to τ0 in the
N -stage δ-discounted game starting in stage 1. Note that the strategy σ0 is also a best-reply
to τ0 on any of the consecutive blocks of N stages, conditional on past play.
11 In particular,
σ∗ is a best-reply to τ∗.
5.1.2 Equilibrium properties
We here argue that, for appropriate choices of N and of δ, τ∗ is a best-reply to σ∗, and
(σ∗, τ∗) induces a payoff arbitrarily close to U(µ0, y).
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Proposition 1 For every η > 0, there exists N0 ∈ N such that the following holds. For
every N ≥ N, there is δ0 < 1 such that, for every δ ≥ δ0, the profile (σ∗, τ∗) is a sequential
equilibrium and induces a payoff within η of U(µ0, y).
The complete proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. The crucial step consists in
showing that the fact that σ0 is a best-reply to τ0 implies that, with high probability, σ0
reports the true state in most stages. This is the content of Lemma 2 below. In the statement
of the lemma, µσ0,τ0 is the (expected, undiscounted) joint distribution of states and reports
in a block of N stages. That is, for each (s, a) ∈ S × S,
µσ0,τ0(s, a) := Eσ0,τ0
[
1
N
N∑
n=1
1{sn=s,θn=a}
]
is the expected frequency of the pair (s, a) over N stages (recall that the distribution of the
initial state, s1, is the invariant measure).
Lemma 2 For every η > 0, there is N0 ∈ N, such that the following holds. For every
N ≥ N0, there is δ0 < 1, such that, for every δ ≥ δ0, one has
‖µσ0,τ0 − µ0‖ < η.
10Indeed, denote by Xn ∼ U([0, 1]) the output of the public device in stage n, and label the receiver’s
actions from 1 to |B|. We let the strategy τ0 instruct the receiver to choose the action b ∈ B whenever
b−1∑
i=1
y(i | θn) ≤ Xn <
b∑
i=1
y(i | θn). In effect, the device is performing publicly the desired randomization.
11This observation relies on the fact that, in the first block, σ0 is a best-reply to τ0, no matter what the
distribution of the initial state s1 is.
12Off-equilibrium path beliefs and sequential rationality issues are discussed in the Appendix.
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We will provide insights into the proof of Lemma 2 below. For the time being, we show
how to deduce Proposition 1 from Lemma 2. Observe first that, by definition of µσ0,τ0, the
expected average13 payoff induced by (σ0, τ0) over a single block is equal to U(µσ0,τ0, y). For
fixed N , and since the profile (σ∗, τ∗) consists in periodic repetitions of (σ0, τ0), the discounted
payoff induced by (σ0, τ0) therefore converges to U(µσ0,τ0 , y) as δ → 1. In particular, it is
thus arbitrarily close to the target payoff U(µ0, y).
We now argue that τ∗ is a best-reply to σ∗. Following any history, the continuation payoff
of the receiver is equal to the sum of his payoffs until the end of the current block and of
the continuation payoff from the next block on. The latter is equal to the discounted payoff
induced by (σ∗, τ∗), computed using the belief held by the receiver at the beginning of this
block. For fixed N , this continuation payoff thus converges to U2(µσ0,τ0 , y) as δ → 1.
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On the other hand, any deviation from τ0, say in stage n, triggers a babbling play, and
the receiver’s continuation payoff therefore does not exceed (1 − δ)
∞∑
k=n
δk−nmax
b∈B
u2(pk, b),
where pk is the belief that the receiver will hold at stage k ≥ n on the current state sk. Since
the sequence of states forms an irreducible and aperiodic chain, pk converges to m. For fixed
N , this continuation payoff therefore converges to v2 as δ → 1 (again, uniformly over all
histories).
Since U2(µσ0,τ0, y) > v
2, this proves the best-reply property of τ0, provided first N , and
then δ, are chosen large enough.
We now turn to Lemma 2. We denote by σtruth the strategy of the sender that announces
truthfully the current state, no matter what. The proof of Lemma 2 combines several ideas.
First, by a law of large numbers for Markov Chains, and if N is large enough, there is
a high probability that the realized state frequencies will be consistent with the quotas in
most stages. Thus, under (σtruth, τ0), there is a high probability that the receiver follows the
announcement of the sender in most stages. That is, the distribution µσtruth,τ0 is arbitrarily
close to µ0.
Next, for fixed N , and for every (periodic) strategy σ (and viewing τ0 as a periodic
strategy), the discounted payoff γδ(σ, τ0) converges to U(µσ,τ0 , y) as δ converges to one.
Finally, the best-reply property of σ0 implies that γ
1
δ (σ0, τ0) ≥ γ
1
δ (σtruth, τ0).
13That is, when payoffs in the different stages are not discounted.
14Uniformly over all histories.
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Combining these observations, the following formal statement holds. For every ε > 0,
there exist N0 and δ0 such that, for every δ ≥ δ0, the following sequence of inequalities holds:
U1(µσ0,τ0 , y) ≥ γ
1
δ (σ0, τ0)−ε ≥ γ
1
δ (σtruth, τ0)−ε ≥ U
1(µσtruth,τ0, y)−2ε ≥ U
1(µ0, y)−3ε. (2)
To conclude, we will rely on Lemma 3 below, which critically depends on the assumption
that U(µ0, m0) ∈ Ê(M). Denote byMe the (finite) set of extreme points ofM. Recall that
µ0 ∈Me. Set
c1 := min
{µe∈Me,µe 6=µ0}
(
U1(µ0, y0)− U
1(µe, y0)
)
, and c2 := max
{µe∈Me,µe 6=µ0}
‖µe − µ0‖1,
and note that both c1 and c2 are positive.
Lemma 3 For every µ ∈M, one has
U1(µ0, y)− U
1(µ, y) ≥
εc1
c2
‖µ− µ0‖1.
Lemma 3 may be paraphrased as saying that any strategy that does approximately as well
as the truth-telling strategy must be telling the truth in most stages, with high probability.
The conclusion of Lemma 2 follows from (2) combined with Lemma 3.
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We here provide insights into the proof of Theorem 2. We let δ < 1, and we fix a Nash
equilibrium (σ, τ) of the δ-discounted game (with or without randomizing device). For
clarity, we sometimes use boldfaced letters to denote random variables.
For s ∈ S, we define y(· | s) ∈ ∆(B) as the expected discounted distribution of moves of
the receiver in state s. Formally, for s ∈ S, and b ∈ B, we set
y(b | s) =
1
m(s)
Eσ,τ
[
∞∑
n=1
(1− δ)δn−11{sn=s,bn=b}
]
=
Eσ,τ
[∑∞
n=1(1− δ)δ
n−11{sn=s,bn=b}
]
Eσ,τ
[∑∞
n=1(1− δ)δ
n−11{sn=s}
] .
By construction, one has γδ(σ, τ) = U(µ0, y). Indeed,
γδ(σ, τ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
n=1
δn−1Eσ,τ [u(sn,bn)] = (1− δ)
∞∑
n=1
δn−1
∑
s∈S,b∈B
Eσ,τ [1{sn=s,bn=b}]u(s, b)
=
∑
s∈S,b∈B
u(s, b)m(s)y(b | s) = U(µ0, y),
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as desired.
Since the distribution of sn is equal to m for each stage n ∈ N, one has γ2δ (σ, τ) ≥ v
2,
and thus, U2(µ0, y) ≥ v2, so that C2 holds.
We thus need to prove that U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for each µ ∈ M. The idea of the proof
is rather straightforward, but the formal proof is fraught with many technical complications.
Let µ ∈ M be given. We will construct a strategy σ′ of the sender such that γδ(σ′, τ) =
U(µ, y), so that the desired inequality will follow from the equilibrium property of (σ, τ).
The strategy σ′ is designed as follows. Along the play, the sender will generate a sequence
(tn) of fictitious states that is statistically indistinguishable from the sequence (sn), and such
that the average distribution of the pair (sn, tn) is given by µ. Given such a sequence, in
any stage n, the sender will substitute the fictitious state tn to the realized state sn in
playing σ. Formally, following any history (s1, t1, a1, b1, . . . , sn, tn) consisting of realized and
fictitious states, messages and actions up to stage n, the strategy σ′ plays the mixed move
σ(t1, a1, b1 . . . , tn) that would have been played by σ, had the realized states been t1, . . . , tn.
We now give some more details. Since the strategy τ may feature complex statistical
tests on the successive announcements, the notion of being statistically indistinguishable has
to be interpreted in a restrictive sense.
We prove in the Appendix the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Assume Assumption A, and let µ ∈ M be given. There exists an S-valued
process15 (tn)n, such that:
P1 Conditional on sn, the vector (t1, . . . , tn) is independent of the future states (sn+1, sn+2, . . .).
P2 The law of the sequence (tn)n is the same as the law of the sequence (sn)n.
P3 The law of the pair (sn, tn) is µ, for each stage n ∈ N.
P4 The conditional law of sn, given t1, . . . , tn is µ(· | tn).
According to P1, the state tn can be computed/simulated using only the information
available at stage n: past and current states, and past fictitious states. This is a feasibility
requirement that ensures that σ′ is well-defined. Condition P2 ensures that no statistical test
can discriminate between the sequences (sn) and (tn). Condition P3 provides the desired
coupling between sn and tn.
15The process (tn)n is possibly defined on a probability space which is an enlargement of the one on which
(sn)n is defined.
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We now proceed to show that the expected payoff induced by (σ′, τ) is then equal to
U(µ, y), as claimed.
Below we will denote by sk, tk, bk generic values of the random variables sk, tk and bk,
respectively. For any given stage n ∈ N, the following sequence of equalities holds:
Eσ′,τ [u(sn,bn)] =
∑
sn,bn
Pσ′,τ(sn = sn,bn = bn)u(sn, bn)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
Pσ′,τ (sn, t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (3)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
Pσ′,τ (sn | t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)Pσ′,τ (t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
P(sn | t1, . . . , tn)Pσ′,τ(t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (4)
=
∑
sn
∑
t1,...,tn
∑
b1,...,bn
µ(sn | tn)Pσ′,τ(t1, . . . , tn, b1, . . . , bn)u(sn, bn) (5)
=
∑
sn,tn,bn
µ(sn | tn)Pσ′,τ (tn, bn)u(sn, bn), (6)
(7)
where (4) holds because the variables (b1, . . . ,bn) are conditionnally independent of sn given
(t1, . . . , tn), and (5) holds by P4.
Using P2, and by the definition of σ′, the δ-discounted sum of Pσ′,τ (tn = tn,bn = bn) is
equal to Pσ,τ (sn = tn,bn = bn), which is equal to µ(tn)× y(bn | tn). By (7) we now obtain
γδ(σ
′, τ) =
∑
s,t,b
µ(s | t)µ(t)y(b | t)u(s, b) = U(µ, y).
6 Further results and comments
6.1 On the condition Ê(M) 6= ∅
In the light of existing results for repeated games, it is not surprising that some non-empty
interiority type of assumption is needed (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for a survey).
As the next example illustrates, the conclusion of Theorem 1 fails to hold if Ê(M) = ∅.
Example 2 Let there be two states and two actions for the receiver. The payoffs in the
two states are given by the tables in Figure 4. We assume that the successive states are
independent and that the two states are equally likely.
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l r
0.5, 1 1, 1
State L
l r
0, 0 1, 1
State R
Figure 4: The game in Example 2.
The strategy which plays r irrespective of the announcement is weakly dominant in
the one-shot game, and thus, v2 = 1. Consider now the stationary strategy y defined by
y(l | L) = y(r | R) = 1. The payoff vector U(µ0, y) = (
3
4
, 1) is in E(M). However, we claim
that (1, 1) is the unique equilibrium payoff, irrespective of δ. Here is why. Consider any
equilibrium (σ, τ). Plainly, the equilibrium payoff of the receiver is equal to 1. In particular,
with probability 1 the receiver plays r whenever the current state is R. This implies that
in every stage, and for a.e. past history, there is one (possibly history-dependent) message
following which the receiver plays r, and which is assigned positive probability by σ. But
then, the sender gets a payoff 1 by assigning probability 1 to this specific message in every
stage. 
As we stressed, the statement of Theorem 1 is unsatisfactory in one important respect:
while non-empty interior requirements in existing Folk Theorems are generically satisfied,
the condition Ê(M) 6= ∅ does not hold generically, as the next example shows.
Example 3 Consider the game depicted in Figure 5, where there are two states, and the
receiver has two actions.
l r
1, 1 0, 0
State L
l r
1, 1 0, 0
State R
Figure 5: The game in Example 3.
Here, v2 = 1, and the stationary strategy y∗ which plays l irrespective of the announce-
ment is the only stationary strategy that satisfies C2. Hence, E(M) contains a single payoff
vector, (1, 1), and Ê(M) is empty. When payoffs are slightly perturbed, the strategy y∗
remains the only strategy satisfying C2, therefore Ê(M) = ∅ for any such perturbation. 
Example 3 suggests that if all strategies y for which U(µ0, y) is in E(M) are constant
strategies, then the set Ê(M) is empty, even when payoffs in the game are slightly perturbed.
We build on this intuition, and introduce a new condition.
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Condition B. There is a non-constant map y : S → ∆(B) such that U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M).
If condition B is not met, then all equilibrium payoffs are babbling.
In Theorem 3 below, we fix the transition function of the Markov chain p, and identify a
game to a point in the space R2×S×B of payoff functions.
Theorem 3 Let a game G be given.
If conditionB holds for G, then any neighborhood of G contains a game G′ with ÊG′(M) 6=
∅.
If condition B does not hold for G, there is a neighborhood N of G such that, for every
game in N , condition B does not hold.
Theorem 3 allows us to complete the picture provided by Theorems 1 and 2, provided the
underlying Markov chain satisfies Assumption A. Indeed, let G be a game. If Condition
B holds for the game G, Theorems 1 and 2 provide a characterization of the limit set of
equilibrium payoffs for games arbitrarily close to G. If condition B does not hold for the
game G, then all games close enough to G have only babbling equilibrium payoffs.
6.2 On the role of the randomizing device
The randomizing device is not needed in the proof of Theorem 2 to implement payoffs
U(µ0, y), whenever y(· | s) is a pure strategy: it assigns probability 1 to some action b(s),
for each s ∈ S. However, as soon as y(· | s) is a truly mixed distribution for some state s, it
may be impossible to dispense with the randomizing device, as we now argue by means of
an example.
Let there be two states, L and R. The successive states are drawn independently in every
period, and each of the two states is equally likely. The receiver has three actions, denoted
B = {l, m, r}. The payoffs are given in Figure 6.
l m r
3, 0 0, 4 2, 1
State L
l m r
1,−5 4,−4 2, 1
State R
Figure 6: The payoffs of the players.
Plainly, v2 = 1. Define y∗ to be the stationary strategy such that y∗(· | R) assigns
probability 1 to r, and y∗(· | L) assigns probabilities
2
3
and 1
3
to l and m, respectively. Then
U(µ0, y) = (2,
7
6
), and one can verify that U(µ0, y∗) ∈ E(M) while Ê(M) 6= ∅. Thus, using
23
Theorem 1, the vector (2, 7
6
) can be approximated by sequential equilibrium payoffs, when
players are sufficiently patient, provided a randomizing device is available.
We now assume that such a device is not available. Since successive states are indepen-
dent, the dynamic game can be viewed as a infinite repetition of the one-shot information
transmission game. With this interpretation, an action of the sender in the one-shot game
is a map x : S → A, while an action of the receiver is a map y : A → B. Given an action
profile (x, y), payoffs are random, and take the value u(s, y(x(s))) with probability m(s), for
s ∈ S. Players then receive the public signal (x(s), y(x(s))).
We will rely on Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin’s (1994) characterization of the limit set
of perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoffs in repeated games with public signals. Some
care is needed, as there are two dimensions according to which our repeated game does not
fit into their setup. First, they assume that a player’s payoff depends deterministically on
his own action and on the public signal, while payoffs here depend randomly on the entire
action profile (x, y). Second, their result is a characterization of public equilibrium payoffs,
while we focus on sequential equilibrium payoffs.
We briefly argue that their result nevertheless applies to our setting. On the one hand,
their result is still valid for games where payoffs depend on the entire action profile.16 Next,
it can be verified that the auxiliary game in which stage payoffs are defined to be the expected
stage payoffs in our game (given the action profile) has the same set of PPE payoffs. Thus,
their result provides a characterization of the limit set of PPE payoffs for our game. On the
other hand, let (σ, τ) be a sequential equilibrium of our game, and define a public strategy
profile (σ¯, τ¯) as follows. Let any public history h¯ be given. At h¯, we let σ¯ play the expectation
of the mixed move played by σ, where the expectation is computed w.r.t. the belief held
by the receiver at the information set which contains h¯. We define τ¯(h) by exchanging the
roles of the two players. It can be verified that (σ¯, τ¯) is a public perfect equilibrium of the
repeated game.
Fudenberg et al. (1994) showed that γ ∈ R2 is a limit PPE payoff if and only if for all
λ ∈ R2 we have λ · γ ≤ k(λ), where k(λ) is the solution to a certain optimization problem
P(λ).17
We set γ = (2, 7
6
), and we will show that it is not a PPE Payoff using the condition of
Fudenberg et al. (1994) with λ∗ = (0, 1). We now recall Fudenberg et al. (1994) definition
16This can be seen from their proof or, alternatively, deduced from Ho¨rner et al. (2009).
17Their result requires that a certain set have a non-empty interior, a condition that can be checked to be
met here.
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of k(λ∗), and we will show that λ∗ · γ > k(λ∗), implying that γ is not a limit PPE payoff.
We denote by Z = A × B the set of public signals in our game. The quantity k(λ∗) is
defined as the value of the optimization problem P:
supV 2,
where the supremum is taken over all (V 1, V 2) ∈ R2, and all φ : Z → R2, such that
• φ2(z) ≤ 0 for every z ∈ Z;
• (V 1, V 2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game, with payoff function defined
by: ∑
s∈S
m(s) (u(s, y(x(s))) + φ(x(s), y(x(s)))) , (8)
for each action pair (x, y).
Let φ : Z → R2 be any map such that φ2(z) ≤ 0 for each z ∈ Z, and let (α, β) be any
(possibly mixed) equilibrium of the one-shot game (8), with payoff (V 1, V 2). We will prove
that V 2 < 7
6
. We argue by contradiction, and assume that V 2 ≥ 7
6
. We distinguish between
two cases.
Assume first that α : S → ∆(A) is pooling: the distribution of messages is the same in
both states. Then, since φ2(z) ≤ 0, the expected payoff of the receiver is not higher than
max
b∈B
∑
s∈S
m(s)u2(s, b) = 1.
Thus, V 2 ≤ 1 < 7
6
, which is the desired contradiction.
Assume next that α is not pooling. Up to a relabelling of the messages, we may then
assume w.l.o.g. that the sender always tells the truth with positive probability. That is,
α(s | s) > 0, for each s ∈ S. We denote by β˜(· | s) the conditional distribution of the
receiver’s move under (α, β), conditional on the state being s ∈ S. Denoting by s 6= t the
two states, the equilibrium property for the sender in the game (8) then implies that∑
b∈B
β(b | s)
(
u1(s, b) + φ1(s, b)
)
≥
∑
b∈B
β(b | t)
(
u1(s, b) + φ1(t, b)
)
,
with equality if α(· | s) assigns positive probability to both messages, and∑
b∈B
β(b | t)
(
u1(t, b) + φ1(t, b)
)
≥
∑
b∈B
β(b | s)
(
u1(t, b) + φ1(s, b)
)
.
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Using the two inequalities, one can verify that
u1(s, β˜(· | s)) + u1(t, β˜(· | t)) ≥ u1(s, β˜(· | t)) + u1(t, β˜(· | s)).
By Lemma 1, condition C2 therefore holds for the stationary strategy β˜.
On the other hand, since φ2(z) ≤ 0 for each z, the expected payoff V 2 to the receiver does
not exceed U2(µ0, β˜). Hence, U
2(µ0, β˜) ≥
7
6
. This readily implies that U(µ0, β˜) ∈ E(M).
Next, one can verify that the highest payoff U2(µ0, β˜) to the receiver, over the whole set
U(µ0, β˜) ∈ E(M), is equal to
7
6
. In addition, the unique strategy β˜ that achieves such a
payoff is the strategy y∗. Since the supports of y∗(· | L) and y∗(· | R) are distinct, it must
therefore be that α is truth-telling: α(s | s) = 1 for each s. Therefore, β is equal to y∗.
Since V 2 ≥ 7
6
and V 2 ≤ U2(µ0, y∗), one also has V 2 = U2(µ0, y∗). In particular, the
expectation of φ2(z) under the equilibrium profile (α, β) must be equal to zero. Since φ2(z) ≤
0 for each z, this implies that φ2(z) = 0, for each public signal z that receives positive
probability under (α, β).
Using this, we finally claim that the equilibrium condition for the receiver in the game
(8) is violated. Indeed, when told L, the strategy β = y∗ assigns positive probability to both
l and m. Hence, φ2(L, l) = φ2(L,m) = 0 by the previous paragraph. On the other hand
however, u2(L,m) > u2(L, l), hence the receiver is not indifferent between both actions. This
is the desired contradiction.
6.3 Imperfect monitoring
Let us assume here that successive states are independent. Results continue to hold if the
receiver only observes a noisy, public version of the sender’s message (provided the definition
of U(µ, y) is modified in an appropriate way). They still hold if the receiver observes a noisy,
public signal of the current state, provided the individual rationality level v2 is modified
in the proper way. They also hold, without changes, if the sender only observes a noisy,
public signal of the receiver’s action. What happens in any of these variants when signals
are private is beyond the scope of the paper.
We briefly conclude this section by discussing the case where the sender fails to receive
any information relative to the receiver’s choices. In spite of this feature, the game does
not reduce to a sequence of successive, independent, one-shot games, because of the ability
of the receiver to monitor the sender. In particular, it is easy to construct examples with
equilibrium payoffs that lie outside of the convex hull of the set of equilibrium payoffs in the
one-shot game.
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We refer to the game where the sender does not observe the actions of the receiver as to
the blind game. Denote by NEbδ the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the blind game.
We prove that the value of monitoring is positive, in the sense that allowing the sender to
monitor the receiver has a non-ambiguous effect on the equilibrium set.
Proposition 2 The set NEbδ is a subset of NEδ.
Proof. Let (σ, τ) be a Nash equilibrium of the blind game. Define τ ′ to be the following
strategy that depends only on the sender’s announcements, and not on the receiver’s past
actions: after a sequence (a1, . . . , an) of announcements, τ
′ plays any action b ∈ B with the
probability that the n-th action of the receiver according to τ is b, conditional on the sender’s
announcements being (a1, . . . , an):
τ ′(a1, . . . , an)[b] = E [τ(a1, b1, a2, b2, . . . , bn−1, an)[b] | a1, a2, . . . , an] .
In words, τ ′ gets rid of the possible correlation between successive actions of the receiver,
that may exist in the strategy τ .
We claim that the strategy profile (σ, τ ′) is a Nash equilibrium of the blind game. Indeed,
τ ′ is a best-reply to σ because it induces the same payoff as τ . σ is a best-reply to τ ′ because
any strategy of the sender in the blind game induces the same expected payoff against τ or
τ ′.
We next claim that the strategy profile (σ, τ ′) is a Nash equilibrium of the non-blind
game. Indeed, because under σ, the sender does not condition his play on past actions of the
receiver, and because τ ′ is a best response to σ in the blind game, it follows that τ ′ is a best
response to σ in the non-blind game as well. Because the receiver’s actions are conditionally
independent, given the sender’s announcements, any profitable deviation against τ ′ in the
non-blind game is also profitable in the blind game.
The inclusion is strict in general, as Example 4 below shows.
Example 4 There are two states S = {L,R}, and three actions for the receiver, B =
{l, m, r}. The payoffs in the two states are given in Figure 7.
l m r
2, 2 0, 0 0, 0
State L
l m r
0, 0 2, 2 0, 3
State R
Figure 7: The game in Example 4.
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We claim that (2, 2) is an equilibrium payoff when the sender observes the actions of
the receiver, but it is no longer an equilibrium payoff when the sender does not observe the
receiver’s actions.
Note first that v2 = 3
2
, and that Ê(M) 6= ∅. By Theorem 1, (2, 2) ∈ E(M), so that
(2, 2) ∈ lim infδ→1 SEδ ⊆ lim infδ→1NEδ.
We now argue that (2, 2) is bounded away from the set NEbδ . Indeed, assume to the
contrary that there is some equilibrium profile (σ, τ) of the blind game with a payoff close to
(2, 2). In particular, with a probability close to one, there is a positive fraction of the stages
in which the current state is R and the receiver plays m. Consider the strategy τ ′ which
plays as τ , except that τ ′ plays r whenever τ would play m. Because the sender does not
observe the receiver’s actions, he cannot tell whether the receiver uses τ or τ ′, and therefore
τ ′ is a profitable deviation of the receiver: it yields the receiver payoff close to 21
2
. 
6.4 Relation to the one-shot game
The characterization implies that every equilibrium payoff of the one-shot game remains an
equilibrium payoff in the dynamic game, provided players are patient enough. This property
is not obvious a priori, since the game is not a repeated game. In particular, it would
typically fail to hold if the state were constant throughout the play.
Let (σ, τ) be an equilibrium of the one-shot game. Let y : A→ ∆(B) be the stationary
strategy defined as
y(b | a) =
∑
s∈S
σ(a | s)τ(a)[b].
Note that the expected payoff under (σ, τ) is U(µ0, y). We claim that U(µ0, y) ∈ E(M),
so that by Theorem 1 it is a sequential equilibrium payoff in the repeated game. Indeed,
because the receiver can guarantee v2 in the one-shot game, condition C2 holds. Because
σ is a best reply to τ in the one-shot game, the inequality in C1 holds for every µ, and in
particular for every µ ∈M.
This result has the implication that the lowest equilibrium payoff of the sender in the
repeated game cannot be higher than his lowest equilibrium payoff in the one shot game. As
the example in Section 3 shows, it can in fact be strictly lower.
On the other hand, the lowest equilibrium payoff of the receiver in both the one-shot
game and the repeated game is equal to his babbling equilibrium payoff v2.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1 we need the following description ofM, which is of independent interest.
A permutation matrix is a (square) matrix with entries in {0, 1}, such that each row
and each column contains exactly one entry equal to 1. We denote by Φ the set of S × S
permutation matrices, and by I the matrix that corresponds to the identity permutation.
Lemma 5 The set M(m) is equal to
M(m) = (µ0 − I + co Φ) ∩R
S×S
+ .
Proof. The inclusion ⊇ is clear. We prove the reverse inclusion. Take µ in M(m), and
define the matrix J := µ+ I − µ0 in RS×S. J is a bistochastic matrix, hence it is a convex
combination of permutation matrices. Since µ = J − I + µ0, the result follows.
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Proof of Lemma 1. We only prove that C1 is equivalent to C’1. For every permutation φ
over S denote by µφ ∈ S×S the matrix where the entry (s, t) is equal to 1 if t = φ(s), and is 0
otherwise. Note that U1(I, y) =
∑
s∈S u
1(s, y(· | s)), and U1(µφ, y) =
∑
s∈S u
1(s, y(· | φ(s))).
Assume first that C’1 holds, and let µ ∈ M(m). By Lemma 5, µ can be written
µ = µ0 − I +
∑
φ αφP
φ, where the αφ are non negative real numbers that sum to one.
Because U1 is linear in µ,
U1(µ, y) = U1(µ0, y)− U
1(I, y) +
∑
φ
αφU
1(µφ, y).
ByC’1, U1(I, y) ≥ U1(µφ, y) for every permutation φ, and therefore U1(I, y) ≥
∑
φ αφU
1(µφ, y).
It follows that U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y). Because this inequality holds for every µ ∈ M(µ), C1
holds.
Assume now that C1 holds. Fix a permutation φ, and define µε = µ0 − εI + εµφ, where
ε > 0. Because m has full support, one has µε ∈ M(m) provided ε is sufficiently small.
Now, by C1, for each such ε,
U1(µ0, y) ≥ U
1(µε, y) = U
1(µ0, y)− εU
1(I, y) + εU1(µφ, y).
It follows that U1(µφ, y) ≤ εU1(I, y). As this inequality holds for every permutation φ, C’1
holds.
B Complements to the proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 given in the text is almost complete. For completeness, we provide
below the proofs of Proposition 1 and of Lemma 3, which are missing.
We start by addressing the issue of designing a system of beliefs for the receiver that
is consistent with σ∗, and that satisfies an additional property. Since the game involves
randomizing devices with uncountably many outcomes, the standard definition of consistency
does not apply. We denote by λ ∈ ∆(S) a distribution with full support and, for η < 0, we
denote by ση the strategy that, following any history hn, plays ηλ+ (1− η)σ∗(hn).
One can check that, for η > 0, the beliefs of the receiver are uniquely defined by Bayes
rule, and have a limit when η = 0.18 Note that, following any history that is inconsistent
with τ0, the belief of the receiver in stage n is independent of tn.
19
18And the convergence is uniform w.r.t. the receiver’s information set.
19That is, should the sender fail to play the babbling announcement a¯, the receiver sill interprets the
sender’s announcements as babbling.
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We denote by τ∗ a strategy that coincides with τ0 as long as the sender does not deviate,
and that plays in each later stage n an action that (i) maximizes the current expected payoff
of the receiver, given the belief held by the receiver in stage n, and (ii) does not depend on
the announcements made by the sender since the deviation took place.
By construction, the strategy σ∗ is sequentially rational at each information set of the
sender, while the strategy τ∗ is sequentially rational at each information set of the receiver
that is inconsistent with τ0.
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume w.l.o.g. that all payoffs belong to the interval [0, 1]. Define by σtruth the strategy of
the sender that announces truthfully the current state sn in each stage n ≤ N , and by τtruth
the strategy of the receiver that plays y(tn) in each stage n ≤ N . Thus, τtruth coincides with
τ0 until stage q.
Let η be given, and set ξ = η
|S|+2
. For every state s ∈ S and every n ∈ N, denote by
Fn(s) the empirical frequency of visits to s up to (and including) stage n. Since the Markov
chain is aperiodic, by the ergodic theorem there is N0 such that with probability at least
1 − ξ, F(1−ξ)N (s) ≤ mN(S) for every state s ∈ S, as soon as N ≥ N0. It follows that τ0
coincides with τtruth in the first (1− ξ)N stages, so that with probability at least 1− ξ,
‖µσtruth,τ0 − µ0‖1 ≤ |S|ξ.
This implies that
U1(µσtruth,τ0, y) > U
1(µ0, y)− (|S|+ 1)ξ.
For fixed N , as δ converges to 1, the discounted payoff in each block converges to the average
payoff in that block, and therefore for δ sufficiently large
γ1δ (σtruth, τ0) > U
1(µ0, y)− (|S|+ 2)ξ.
Because σ0 is a best reply to τ0, we deduce that
γ1δ (σ0, τ0) ≥ γ
1
δ (σtruth, τ0) > U
1(µ0, y)− (|S|+ 2)ξ = U
1(µ0, y)− η.
We again use the fact that, for fixed N , as δ goes to 1, the payoff γδ(σ0, τ0) converges to
U(µσ0,τ0 , y) to deduce that
U1(µσ0,τ0 , y) > U
1(µ0, y)− η. (9)
For fixed N , and for every δ, the marginal distributions of µσ0,τ0 ∈ ∆(S × A) on S and
A are respectively equal to m and to mN .
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Since the approximation mN converges to m as N → +∞, the distribution µσ0,τ0 con-
verges to the set M of copulas. Using Lemma 3, Proposition 1 therefore follows from (9).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Let a copula µ ∈ M be given. Present µ as a convex combination of the extreme points
(µe)e of M: µ =
∑
µe∈Me
αeµe, with αe ≥ 0 and
∑
µe∈Me
αe = 1. Recall that µ0 is one of the
extreme points of M.
On the one hand, since U1 is bi-linear, one has
U1(µ0, y)− U
1(µ, y) = εU1(µ0, y0) + (1− ε)U
1(µ0, y1)− εU
1(µ, y0)− (1− ε)U
1(µ, y1)
≥ ε
(
U1(µ0, y0)− U
1(µ, y0)
)
(10)
= ε
(
(1− α0)U
1(µ0, y0)−
∑
µe 6=µ0
αeU
1(µe, y0)
)
(11)
≥ ε(1− α0)c1, (12)
where the inequality (10) holds because y1 ∈ Y (M) and by C1.
On the other hand, one has µ− µ0 =
∑
µe∈Me
αe(µe − µ0), hence
‖µ− µ0‖1 ≤ c2
∑
µe∈Me,µe 6=µ0
αe = c2(1− α0). (13)
The result follows from (12) and (13).
C Complements to the proof of Theorem 2
We here prove Lemma 4. For clarity, we introduce yet another copy T of the set S. Intuitively,
fictituous states are T -valued, while realized ones are S-valued.
Define M′ ⊆ ∆(S × T ) to be the set of distributions µ ∈ M such that the following
property P holds:
Property P. For every (s, t) ∈ S × T , one has∑
s′∈S
µ(s′ | t)p(s | s′) =
∑
t′∈T
µ(s | t′)p(t′ | t). (14)
We will prove
Lemma 6 Under Assumption A, the set M′ coincides with the set M.
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Lemma 7 Let µ ∈M′ be given. There exists an S-valued process20 (tn)n, such that:
P1 The law of the sequence (tn)n is the same as the law of the sequence (sn)n.
P2 The law of the pair (sn, tn) is µ, for each stage n ∈ N.
P3 The conditional law of sn, given t1, . . . , tn is µ(· | tn).
P4 Conditional on sn, the vector (t1, . . . , tn) is independent of the future states (sn+1, sn+2, . . .).
We emphasize that only Lemma 6 makes use of Assumption A. This has the following
consequence. Given µ ∈ M′, using Lemma 7 and the construction of the paper, one has
U1(µ0, y) ≥ U
1(µ, y). Thus, the conclusion U1(µ0, y) = maxµ∈M′ U
1(µ, y) holds, irrespective
of whether Assumption A is met or not.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 7
Let µ ∈M′ be given, and define µ¯ ∈ ∆(T × S × T ) by
µ¯(t′, s, t) = µ(s, t)p(t | t′)
m(t′)
m(t)
, (t′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T. (15)
For every two indices i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with i < j, denote by µ¯i,j the marginal of µ¯ on the i-th
and j-th coordinates.
We will use the following properties of µ¯.
Lemma 8 One has
1. µ¯2,3 = µ;
2. µ¯1,3(t
′, t) = m(t′)p(t | t′) for every t, t′ ∈ T ;
3. µ¯1,2(t
′, s′) =
∑
s∈S µ¯2,3(s, t
′)p(s′ | s), for each t′ ∈ T, s′ ∈ S;
4. µ¯(s | t′, t) = µ(s | t) for each (t′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T .
Proof. We prove the four claims in turn. Let s, t ∈ S × T be given. One has
µ¯2,3(s, t) =
∑
t′∈T
µ¯(t′, s, t) =
∑
t′∈T
µ(s, t)p(t | t′)
m(t′)
m(t)
=
µ(s, t)
m(t)
∑
t′∈T
p(t | t′)m(t′) = µ(s, t),
20The process (tn)n is possibly defined on a probability space which is an enlargement of the one on which
(sn)n is defined.
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which proves the first claim.
To prove the second claim, let t′, t ∈ T be given. One has
µ¯1,3(t
′, t) =
∑
s∈S
µ¯(t′, s, t) =
∑
s∈S
µ(s, t)p(t | t′)
m(t′)
m(t)
= p(t | t′)m(t′),
where the last equality holds since the marginal distribution of µ on S is m.
We turn to the third claim. Let t′ ∈ T , s′ ∈ S be given. By the first claim, and since
µ ∈M′, one has∑
s∈S
µ¯2,3(s, t
′)p(s′ | s) =
∑
s∈S
µ(s, t′)p(s′ | s) = m(t′)
∑
t∈T
µ(s′ | t)p(t | t′). (16)
On the other hand,
µ¯1,2(t
′, s′) =
∑
t∈T
µ¯(t′, s′, t) =
∑
t∈T
µ(s′, t)p(t | t′)
m(t′)
m(t)
. (17)
The third claim follows from (16) and (17).
Finally, let (t′, s, t) ∈ T × S × T be given. By the second claim,
µ¯(s | t′, t) =
µ¯(t′, s, t)
µ1,3(t′, t)
=
µ(s, t)p(t | t′)
p(t | t′)m(t′)
×
m(t′)
m(t)
= µ(s | t),
and the fourth claim follows.
We construct the sequence (tn)n as follows. The initial values t0 and t1 are drawn
according to the conditional distribution µ¯(·|s1) ∈ ∆(T × T ). For n 6= 2, tn is drawn
according to the conditional distribution µ¯(· | tn−1, sn). In this construction, t0 is used to
unify the treatment of s1 with that of (sn)n≥2. Property P4 thus holds by construction.
Properties P1 and P2 follow from the next lemma.
Lemma 9 The law of (tn−1, sn, tn) is equal to µ¯, for each stage n ≥ 1.
Proof. We argue by induction. Observe that the law of s1 is equal to m. Therefore,
P((t0, s1, t1) = (t
′, s, t)) = m(s)µ¯(t′, t | s) = µ¯(t′, s, t).
Assume that the claim holds for some n ∈ N. We will prove that the law of (tn, sn+1) is
then equal to µ¯1,2. This follows from the following sequence of equalities, which holds for
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every t′ ∈ T, s ∈ S:
P((tn, sn+1) = (t
′, s)) =
∑
s′∈S
P((sn, tn, sn+1) = (s
′, t′, s))
=
∑
s′∈S
P((sn, tn) = (s
′, t′))×P(sn+1 = s|(sn, tn) = (s
′, t))
=
∑
s′∈S
µ¯2,3(s
′, t′)p(s | s′) = µ¯1,2(t
′, s),
where the last equality follows from Lemma 8(3) and P4. Since the conditional law of
tn+1 given (tn, sn+1) is equal to µ¯(· | tn, sn+1), this yields the claim for n+ 1.
Finally, property P3 follows from the second part of the next lemma. The first part of
the lemma is needed to the proof of the second part.
Lemma 10 (1) The conditional law of tn given (t0, . . . , tn−1) coincides with the conditional
law of tn given tn−1.
(2) The conditional law of sn given (t0, . . . , tn−1, tn) coincides with the conditional law of
sn given tn.
Proof. The proof is by induction. For n = 1, the first statement trivially holds, while the
second statement holds by Lemma 8(1). Assume that the claim holds for some n ∈ N. For
brevity, we denote by tn, sn, · · · generic values of tn, sn · · · , and we write P(tn, sn) instead of
P((tn, sn) = (tn, sn)).
Observe first that by the definition of (tn),
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn+1∈S
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn, sn+1)
=
∑
sn+1∈S
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)× µ¯(tn+1 | tn, sn+1). (18)
Moreover,
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | t0, . . . , tn)P(sn+1 | sn, t0, . . . , tn)
=
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | t0, . . . , tn)× p(sn+1 | sn)
=
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | tn)× p(sn+1 | sn), (19)
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where the last equality holds by the induction hypothesis. Note that the right-hand side of
(19) is independent of (t0, t1, . . . , tn−1), and therefore
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) = P(sn+1 | tn). (20)
Plugging (19) in (18), one obtains
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn) =
∑
sn+1∈S
∑
sn∈S
P(sn | tn)× p(sn+1 | sn)× µ¯(tn+1 | tn, sn+1).
The right hand side is independent of t1, . . . , tn−1, hence it is equal to P(tn+1 | tn), and the
first part of the lemma follows.
We turn to the second statement. One has
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn+1) =
P(sn+1, tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
=
P(sn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)×P(tn+1 | sn+1, t0, . . . , tn)
P(tn+1 | t0, . . . , tn)
=
P(sn+1 | tn)µ¯(tn+1 | sn+1, tn)
P(tn+1 | tn
= P(sn+1 | tn)
µ(sn+1, tn+1)
µ¯(tn, sn+1)
m(tn)
m(tn+1)
=
µ(sn+1, tn+1)
m(tn+1)
= P(sn+1 | tn+1),
where the third equality holds by (20), the construction of (tn)n and the first claim, and the
fourth equality holds by (15). This concludes the proof of the induction step.
The proof of Lemma 7 is now completed.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 6
We here verify that if Assumption A holds then M = M′. Let p be a transition function
such that p(s′ | s) = αs′ for every two states s 6= s′, and p(s | s) = 1−
∑
s′ 6=s
αs′. Set C =
∑
s∈S
αs.
One can verify that the invariant measure of p is given by m(s) = αs
C
for each s ∈ S.
Let µ ∈ M. We will prove that for every (t, s′) ∈ T × S, the equality∑
s∈S
µ(s | t)p(s′ | s) =
∑
t′∈T
µ(s′ | t′)p(t′ | t) (21)
holds. Fix t ∈ T and s′ ∈ S. Observe that∑
s∈S
µ(s | t)p(s′ | s) = µ(s′ | t)
(
1−
∑
s 6=s′
αs
)
+
∑
s 6=s′
αs′µ(s | t)
= µ(s′ | t)
(
1−
∑
s 6=s′
αs
)
+ αs′(1− µ(s
′ | t))
= αs′ + µ(s
′ | t)(1− C). (22)
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On the other hand, one has
∑
t′∈T
µ(s′ | t′)p(t′ | t) = µ(s′ | t)
(
1−
∑
t′ 6=t
αt′
)
+
∑
t′ 6=t
µ(s′ | t′)αt′ (23)
= µ(s′ | t) (1− C + αt) +
∑
t′ 6=t
µ(s′ | t′)αt′ . (24)
When subtracting (23) from (22) one obtains∑
s∈S
µ(s | t)p(s′ | s)−
∑
t′∈T
µ(s′ | t′)p(t′ | t) = αs′ − µ(s
′ | t)αt −
∑
t′ 6=t
µ(s′ | t′)αt′
= αs′ −
∑
t′∈S
µ(s′ | t′)αt′
= αs′ − C
∑
t′∈S
µ(s′ | t′)m(t′) (25)
= αs′ − Cm(s
′) = 0,
where (25) and (26) hold since α(s) = Cm(s) for every s ∈ S. This proves (21), as desired.
D Proof of Theorem 3
The proof of Theorem 3 consists of two independent parts. We first prove that, if condition
B does not hold for some game G, then it does not hold throughout some neighborhood of
G.
Proposition 3 Let G be a game that does not satisfy condition B. Then there is a neigh-
borhood N of G such that no game in N satisfies condition B.
Proof. The proof relies on the theory of semi-algebraic sets. We refer to Bochnak, Coste
and Roy (1998) for the results used below. Recall that the set of extreme points of the
polytope M is denoted by Me.
We will use the following two properties, that hold for constant functions y : S → ∆(B).
R1. If y : S → ∆(B) is constant, then U1(µ0, y) = U1(µ, y) for every µ ∈M.
R2. If y : S → ∆(B) is constant, then U2(µ0, y) ≤ v2.
Property R1 holds because when y is constant, the payoff is independent of the sender’s
announcements. Property R2 holds because v2 is the maximum of U2(µ0, y) over all constant
functions y.
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Given a payoff function u˜ : S × B → R2, we denote by S(u˜) the system of inequalities
U˜2(µ0, y) ≥ v
2
u˜ and U˜
1(µ0, y) ≥ U˜
1(µ, y), for all µ ∈Me,
with unknowns y : S → ∆(B), where v2u˜ = maxb∈B U˜
2(µ0, b) is the min-max value of the
receiver in the game with payoffs u˜.
We say that a vector y ∈ RS×B is constant if y(s, b) only depends on b.
Let u denote the payoff function of G. By assumption, any solution y to S(u) is con-
stant. We will show that this implies that all solutions to S(u˜) are constant, for all u˜ in a
neighborhood of u.
Assume to the contrary that for every ε > 0 there is a payoff function uε ∈ R2(S×B) such
that (i) ‖u− uε‖ < ε, and (ii) the system S(uε) has a non-constant solution yε ∈ RS×B.
This implies that there is a semi-algebraic map ε ∈ (0, 1) 7→ (uε, yε) such that (i)
limε→0 uε = u, and (ii) yε is a non-constant solution to S(uε) for every ε > 0 small enough.
In particular, the map ε 7→ yε has an expansion to a Puiseux series in a neighborhood of
zero: there exist ε0 > 0, a natural number r and vectors yk ∈ RS×B for k ≥ 0 such that
yε =
∞∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk,
for every ε ∈ (0, ε0), and a similar expansion exists for the map ε 7→ uε.
Note that y0 = limε→0 yε. This implies in particular that y0(·, s) ∈ ∆(B) for every s ∈ S,
and that y0 is a solution to S(u). In particular, y0 is constant.
Because yε(·, s) ∈ ∆(B), it follows that
∑
b∈B yε(b | s) = 1 for every ε > 0 and every
s ∈ S, so that
∑
b∈B yk(b | s) = 0 for every k ≥ 1 and every s ∈ S.
Let l ≥ 0 be the maximal integer such that y0, y1, . . . , yl are constant functions. Because
yε is non constant for every ε > 0, we have l <∞. Define a vector d ∈ RB by
d(b) = min
s∈S
yl+1(b, s), ∀b ∈ B.
Note that
yε =
∞∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk (26)
=
(
l∑
k=0
ε
k
r yk + ε
l+1
r d
)
+ ε
l+1
r (yl+1 − d) +
∞∑
k=l+2
ε
k
r yk. (27)
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The first term
(∑l
k=0 ε
k
r yk + ε
l+1
r d
)
is independent of s, and all its coordinates are non-
negative because yε is non-negative for every ε > 0. Set
zε =
∑l
k=0 ε
k
r yk + ε
l+1
r d
1 + ε
l+1
r
∑
b∈B d(b)
∈ RS×B.
Then zε(·, s) ∈ ∆(B) for every s ∈ S, and zε is independent of s. Set
w(·, s) =
yl+1(·, s)− d
−
∑
b∈B d(b)
∈ RS×B, ∀s ∈ S.
Then w(s) ∈ ∆(B) and w is non-constant. We will show that w solves S(u), contradicting
the assumption that all solutions of S(u) are constant.
By R2, for every ε > 0 we have U˜2(µ0, zε) ≤ v2uε. But U˜
2(µ0, yε) ≥ v2uε , and yε is a
convex combination of zε, w, and a “tail” which is of a lower order of ε; by taking the limit
ε→ 0 and using v2uε → v
2 we obtain U2(µ0, w) ≥ v2.
Fix µ ∈ Me. By R1 it follows that U˜
1(µ0, zε) = U˜
1(µ, zε). Because U˜
1(µ0, yε) ≥
U˜1(µ, yε), it follows for the same reasoning as above that U
1(µ0, w) ≥ U1(µ, w).
We turn to the second part of the proof.
Proposition 4 Let G be a game such that condition B holds. Then any neighborhood of
the game G contains a game G′ such that ÊG′(M) 6= ∅.
Proof. The proof combines three independent lemmas. We first show that there are
perturbations of u2 such that the inequality in (i) holds strictly for the perturbed game.
Next, we show that the map y may be assumed to be one-to-one. Finally, we construct
perturbations of u1 such that the inequalities in (ii) will be strict.
Lemma 11 Let G be a game with payoff function u, and let y : S → ∆(B) be a non-constant
function such that U2(µ0, y) ≥ v2. Then, any neighborhood of u2 contains payoff functions
u˜2 such that U˜2(µ0, y) > v˜
2.
Proof. Define P ∈ ∆(S × B) by P (s, b) := m(s)y(b | s), for s ∈ S, b ∈ B, and let ε > 0
be given. We abuse notations and still denote by P the two marginals of P over S and B.
Note that P (s) = m(s) > 0 for each s ∈ S. Define u˜2 : S × B → R by u˜2(s, b) = u2(s, b) if
P (b) = 0, and
u˜2(s, b) = u2(s, b) + ε
P (s, b)
P (s)P (b)
if P (b) > 0.
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We claim that U˜2(µ0, y) > v˜
2. Since ε is arbitrary, the result will follow. Note first that,
for b ∈ B such that P (b) > 0, one has
U˜2(µ0, b) = U
2(µ0, b) + ε
∑
s∈S
m(s)
P (s, b)
m(s)P (b)
= U2(b, µ0) + ε.
Hence, v˜2 = v2+ε (see Eq. (1)). On the other hand, since y(b | s) = P (s,b)
m(s)
= P (s,b)
P (s)
= P (b | s),
U˜2(µ0, y) = U
2(µ0, y) + ε
∑
s∈S,b∈B
m(s)y(b | s)
P (s, b)
P (s)P (b)
= U2(µ0, y) + ε
∑
s∈S
m(s)
∑
b∈B
P (b | s)2
P (b)
.
Viewed as a function of the probability distribution q ∈ ∆(B), the expression
∑
b∈B
(q(b))2
P (b)
is strictly convex, and admits a unique minimum equal to 1, when q = P . Thus, for fixed
state s ∈ S, one has
∑
b∈B
P (b|s)2
P (b)
≥ 1, with a strict inequality whenever the conditional
distribution P (· | s) differs from P . Since y is non-constant, there exist one state s such that
P (· | s) 6= P . Therefore,
U˜2(µ0, y) > U
2(µ0, y) + ε ≥ v
2 + ε = v˜2,
as desired.
Lemma 12 Let G be a game with payoff function u, and let y : S → ∆(B) be such that
U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for each µ ∈ M. Then, any neighborhood of y in RS×B contains a
one-to-one function y˜ : S → ∆(B) such that U1(µ0, y˜) ≥ U1(µ, y˜) for each µ ∈M.
Proof. It suffices to show the existence of a one-to-one map z˜ : S → ∆(B) such that
U1(µ0, z˜) ≥ U1(µ, z˜) for each µ ∈ M. Indeed, the conclusion of the lemma then follows by
setting y˜ = (1− ε)y + εz˜, for ε > 0 small enough.
Let (zs)s∈S be arbitrary distinct elements of ∆(B). Let φ˜ be a permutation over S
that maximizes the sum
∑
s∈S
u1(s, zψ(s)) over all permutations ψ, and set z˜s = zφ˜(s). By
construction, one has ∑
s∈S
u1(s, z˜s) ≥
∑
s∈S
u1(s, z˜φ(s)),
for every permutation φ over S. By Lemma 1, this implies U1(µ0, z˜) ≥ U
1(µ, z˜) for every
µ ∈M, as desired.
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Lemma 13 Let G be a game with payoff function u, and let y : S → ∆(B) be a one-to-one
map such that U1(µ0, y) ≥ U1(µ, y) for each µ ∈M. Then, any neighborhood of u1 contains
payoff functions u˜1 such that U˜1(µ0, y) > U˜
1(µ, y) for each µ ∈M, µ 6= µ0.
Note that the existence of a stationary strategy y that satisfies the requirements follows from
Lemma 12.
Proof. Let G, u and y be as stated. Given ε > 0, we define u˜1 : S × B → R by
u˜1(s, b) = u1(s, b) + εy(b | s).
We will prove that for every ε > 0, one has U˜1(µ0, y) > U˜
1(µ, y) for each µ ∈M \ {µ0}.
Given a permutation φ over S, we denote by Yφ ∈ R
S×B the vector whose (s, b)-
component is equal to y(b | φ(s)). Then,∑
s∈S
u˜1(s, y(· | φ(s))) =
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y(b | φ(s))u˜(s, b) (28)
=
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y(b | φ(s))u(s, b) + ε
∑
s∈S,b∈B
y(b | φ(s))y(b | s) (29)
=
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s)) + ε〈YId, Yφ〉, (30)
where 〈YId, Yφ〉 =
∑
s∈S,b∈B y(b | φ(s))y(b | s) is the standard scalar product in R
S×B.
Since y is one-to-one, the vectors Yφ and YId are not co-linear as soon as φ 6= Id. By
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it follows that
〈YId, Yφ〉 < ‖YId‖2‖Yφ‖2 = ‖YId‖
2 = 〈YId, YId〉 (31)
where the first equality holds since the components of Yφ are obtained by permuting the
components of YId.
On the other hand, observe that by Lemma 1, one has∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | φ(s)) ≤
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s)). (32)
Plugging (32) into (28), one obtains∑
s∈S
u˜1(s, y(· | φ(s)) <
∑
s∈S
u1(s, y(· | s) + 〈YId, YId〉 =
∑
s∈S
u˜1(s, y(· | s)).
By Lemma 1 this yields U˜1(µ0, y) > U˜
1(µ, y), for every µ 6= µ0 in M, as desired.
The proof of Proposition 4 follows from Lemmas 11, 12 and 13.
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